Challenges and risks before see trade liberalization by Dimitrov Martin
GENERAL FRAMEWORK
In June 2001 seven countries in Southeast Europe: Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and FR Yugoslavia signed
in Brussels a Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of a Free
Trade Zone in the region by the end of 2002 on the basis of bilateral trade agree-
ments. The initiative has been supported and coordinated by the Stability Pact.
Current Status: Bilateral free-trade agreements in South-Eastern Europe
Y=has agreement; NEG =in negotiations; *Both CEFTA members
Source: Liz Barret, Business in the Balkans: The case for cross-border co-operation, 2002, p.10
Potential risks regarding the Memorandum:
1 The Memorandum lacks simplicity and standardization. One option for
the agreement was to merge in one standard text for all countries, which
did not actually happen. 
2 Postponed liberalization of several sectors compared to others. This dis-
criminatory progressive liberalization has several negative effects. These
tailor-made schedules may remove the immediate problems of pressure
groups asking the government to be the last one liberalized, but they can
impose high pressure later. As the products, which are liberalized late,
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
A
n
n
a
l
s
 
n
o
 
1
5
6
,
 
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
 
2
0
0
3
 
-
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
2
0
0
3
101
Martin Dimitrov*
CHALLENGES AND RISKS BEFORE SEE TRADE
LIBERALIZATION
* INSTITUTE FOR MARKET ECONOMICS
82A, Dondukov Blvd., P.O. Box 803, 1504 Sofia
tel./fax: (++3592) 943-36-48, 943-49-75, 943-33-52
E-addresses martin@ime.bg; http://www.ime-bg.org
KRATKI ^LANCI/SHORT PAPERS
Albania B&H Bulgaria Croatia Macedonia  Romania Yugoslavia
Albania - - - Y - -
B&H - - Y Y - NEG
Bulgaria - - Y Y * NEG
Croatia - Y Y Y NEG NEG
Macedonia  Y Y Y Y NEG Y
Romania - - * NEG NEG -
Yugoslavia - NEG NEG NEG Y -are precisely those, which have been already able to mobilize powerful
vested interests, these producers will be increasingly opposed to the lib-
eralization process.
3 The initiative would be more market oriented if presuming progressive
liberalization to all commodity groups. 
4 Regarding the EU orientation of regional countries, technical barriers in
manufacturing and agriculture can be unified in converging to the EU
acquis communautaire. The sooner this is agreed the better trade cre-
ation results will be obtained in the region.
5 It is mentioned that the countries are supposed to implement “common
set of preferential rules of origin”. In this case maybe better option is
reducing complexity than implementing preferential rules of origin.
Minimizing the number of different tariffs, which can be imposed on a
specific product, is a way to reduce the complexity of rules of origin. For
example if the difference between MFN (Most Favorite Nation) tariff
and preferential tariff for a given commodity for instance is between 5%
and 7% or less the risk of trade deflection could be considered limited,
which makes rules of origin pointless. 
6 Trade creation effects will depend on governments will to liberalize busi-
ness environment together with trade facilitation process. 
Topic for discussion.
For the small SEE economies protectionism do not represent an alternative
at all. Better constellation is to seek higher regional exposure and effects similar
to economies of scale.
IS FREE TRADE BENEFICIAL?
It is likely that Balkan economies with greater openness would sustain
greater output and, over time, would achieve higher income. Recently, in the
framework of the Economic Freedom Initiative (Fraser Institute is the coordi-
nating and leading party) has been constructed a Trade Openness Index (TOI)
1,
designed to measure the interception of basic growth factors with international
trade. It has 4 components: a) tariff rates, b) the black market exchange rate pre-
mium, c) restrictions on capital movements, and d) the actual size of the trade
sector.
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1 J. Gwartney, C. Skipton, R. Lawson, Trade Openness, Iincome Levels, and Economic Growth, 1980 -
1998.  James Gwartney and Robert Lowson are editors of the Economic Freedom Index of the
World, published since 1997 by the Fraser Institute in Canada; IME is a co-publisher of the Index.The trade Openness Index, Convergence, Key Policy Variables, and Income
t- statistics in parenthesis
* significant at 99% level;  ** significant at 95% level
a – Real GDP numbers are derived using the purchasing power parity method and are in U.S. dollars
b – There are 87 countries in this analysis 
c – High income, long standing OECD members are excluded.
The results in equation 1 illustrate the relationship between country`s aver-
age TOI rating during 1980-98 and a given country’s 1998 per capita GDP, the
correlation is positive and highly significant. The adjusted R-squared compari-
son indicates TOI explains 52% of the variability in 1998 per capita GDP among
the 87 countries. Equation 2 includes inflation and property rights, which signif-
icantly correlate at 95%. The TOI remains highly significant (t = 5.96). The R-
squared adjustment shows that all three variables explain 65% of cross-country
variations in per capita GDP. Equation 3 looks at the relationship between the
TOI and the growth rates of real per capita GDP for 1980-98. The t – ratio for the
TOI is highly significant with R-squared indexes explaining 14% of the cross-
country variation in growth. If we exclude from the equation 5 the high-income
industrial countries (21 long standing OECD members) and reran the model the
results are quite similar to those for all countries. The TOI remains positive and
significant explanandum low-income countries.
GOVERNMENT ROLE AND SIZE IN SEEC.
The table bellow makes an attempt to summarize available data on govern-
ment’s size and role in the economy. It gives an opportunity to compare Balkan
countries (except Bosnia and Herzegovina which, for obvious reasons, is not
monitored) with core EU accession countries and five relatively well performing
leaders of economic liberty. 
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Challenges and risks before see trade liberalization
Real GDP per capita 1998 
       (1)                         (2) 
Average annual growth rate of real per capita GDP-a  
            (3)                         (4)                          (5) 
Trade Openness 
Index (1980-98) 
3.1        (9.6)*  2.0       (5.96)*  0.4       (3.85)* 0.4         (2.8)*  0.3     (2.13)** 
Per capita GDP 
1980
-0.1     (3.13)* 
Property rights 
rating 1980 
1.0       (5.32)*  0.2     (2.33)**  0.2     (2.46)** 
Inflation 
variability rating 
0.5     (2.27)**  0.4
(4.81)*
0.5
(4.89)*
Intercept  -8.1    (4.29)*  -12.2  (6.29)*  -1.0       (1.5)*  -3.6     (5.00)*  -4.3   (4.91)* 
N 87-b  87-b  87-b  87-b  66-c 
Adj R- Squared  .52 .65 .14 .36 .38Governments in business 
a – Scores from 0 to 10 (10 - Benchmark representing maximum economic freedom)
b – Government Consumption as a % of Total and Transfers and Subsidies as a % of GDP
c – Scores from 1 to 5 (1 – Benchmark representing maximum economic freedom); The measure com-
prises both government consumption and government production
Source: Economic Freedom of the World, Heritage Index of Economic Freedom 
The data is for 1999, the year that gives background for comparison; for lack
of space, previous years are omitted (but there are no significant differences from
previous years). Both indexes are far from perfect,
2 but they give an opportunity
to neutralize dramatic political developments, which fit the overall inertia of eco-
nomic phenomena, including that of economic freedom. 
In both indexes, Balkan governments demonstrate relatively high levels of
government interference, combined with, naturally, low levels of economic
activity. This situation is significantly different from countries that maintain
comparable levels of expenditures, transfer and subsidies, but regularly demon-
strate a higher degree of economic freedom. An exception is Albania. Its govern-
ment is rather small, but it lacks reliable market institutions, which ranks the
country relatively unfree. 
Economic freedom is understood as liberty to engage in business and accu-
mulate prosperity, restrained only by the need to sustain this opportunity.
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Country  Economic Freedom of the World 2001 
(Fraser Institute) 
a
Index of Economic 
Freedom (Heritage) 
2002
Government Consumption 
as a % of Total (1999) 
Transfers and Subsidies as a 
% of GDP (1999) 
Government Intervention 
c
Albania  9.0  (9.6
b) 7.8  (8.6
b) 3.0
Croatia  2.8 (30.5)  4.8 (19.5)  3.0
Bulgaria  6.7 (17.1)  6.5 (13.3)  3.0
Macedonia  n.a n.a. 3.0
Romania  6.7 (17.4)  6.7 (12.4)  3.0
Yugoslavia  n.a. n.a. 3.0
Hungary  7.5 (14.4)  4.7 (20)  1.0
Poland  7.1 (16)  3.7 (23.5)  2.0
Czech 
Republic 
3.8 (27)  2.8 (27.1)  2.0
Slovenia  3.8 (27)  1.0 (33.7)  3.0
Germany 4.5 (24.9)  4.5 (20.8)  2.0
Greece  6.6 (17.5)  8.6 (5.6)  2.0
Hong Kong  7.8 (13.5)  - 2.0
Switzerland  6.0 (19.5)  5.5 (17.2)  2.5
USA 5.4 (21.8)  5.6 (16.5)  2.0
2 These indexes use data of the one or two years back and give higher weight to background years in
comparison to last or current year.The table below exhibits a comparison between one of the economic free-
dom indexes and the latest Transparency International CPI for five Balkan coun-
tries,
3 including Greece (EU and NATO member) and Slovenia (reforms, pros-
perity and EU accession front-runner, in comparison with the rest transition
Balkans), plus Hungary (NATO member and EU accession leader). 
Economic freedom and corruption in 2001
a – Scores from 0 to 10 (10 - Benchmark representing maximum economic freedom)
b – Scores from 0 to 10 (10 – Benchmark representing minimum level of corruption)
Usually, there is a strong correlation between the perception of corruption
and the lack of economic freedom, although the latter is measured objectively.
Balkan countries are no exception. 
ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIERS, ENTRY AND EXIT IN SEE – SOCIOLOGICAL
APPROACH
The better way to overview regional obstacles to trade is to interview the very
market participants. This research is part of the Balkan network Initiative 2000, it
consists of interviews (125 firms are included) and ten company case studies, and
was conducted in December 2000 – April 2001 (when the case studies were final-
ized) in Albania, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro; the results are
published in: Obstacles to Trade, Growth, Investment and Competitiveness: Ten
Case Studies of Balkan Business, Sofia, The Balkan Network, 2001. It is also avail-
able at: www.balkannetwork.org. 
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Challenges and risks before see trade liberalization
3 TI does not monitor other countries.
Country  Economic Freedom of the 
World 
(Fraser Institute) 
a
Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index 
b
Bulgaria  5.9 3.9
Croatia  5.2 3.9
Romania  3.8 2.8
Greece  7.3 4.2
Slovenia  6.2 5.2
Hungary  7.1 5.3(1-highest importance, 5- lowest)
A major problem that interviewed companies face trading in the region is
customs formalities, duties and procedures. Another key problems of equal
importance are found in: taxes, contract enforcement and lack of information.
These answers suggest that the basic institutional infrastructure to mediate trade
is missing.
PAYMENT SYSTEM
Relying on the above mentioned sociological research I would like to give
you an anecdotic example on preferred instruments of payment in SEE. You
should keep in mind that results are illustrating international transactions. 
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Martin DimitrovOne third of all payments in the Balkans are claimed to be in cash. A possible
explanation of this situation is that in that way tax payment is avoided, and
moreover, if the money origin is illegal, using banks is not an alternative at all.
Together with barter the non-bank component in the payment system equalizes
the bank segment. 
THE CASE OF BULGARIA
Tariff policy
Over the last three years Bulgaria’s trade regime became less restrictive: the
average tariff rate is reduced from 16.8 % in 1997 to 13.7 % from the beginning
of 2000, non-tariff barriers were reduced substantially as well. Reduction of trade
restrictions is already contributing to trade diversification and improves the effi-
ciency of resource allocation. Under the conditions of monopoly structures, any
effects from decreasing tariffs on resource distribution are lower than in coun-
tries with well-developed property rights. At the same time, Bulgaria’s trade
regime is far more restrictive than the other two currency board countries from
the group of EU candidates, Estonia and Lithuania.
More detailed analysis on Bulgarian tariff measures illustrates the policy
towards liberalization in the last five years. The mean tariff went from 16.1% in
1996 to 10.99 % in 2000. Though, the process of trade liberalization could be
faster. The tariff standard deviation is decreasing, i.e. there is more unified tariff
policy.
Background of tariff measures (Bulgaria)
Source: Ministry of Finance
Trade policies and realities
Bulgaria’s case outlines the regularities of changing trade partners in the sec-
ond half of the nineties and deficiencies and disadvantages of different trade
directions, and highlights the role of the Balkans. I provide detailed analyses on
revealed comparative advantages for different commodity groups following the
Standard International Trade Classification. This approach will helps to identify
sectors where the Balkan market plays a special role vis-à-vis the EU and CEFTA. 
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Challenges and risks before see trade liberalization
Year Mean Median Minimum  Maximum  Std. Dev. 
1996 16.1 15 5 40 8.31
1997 15.49 15 0 40 9.04
1998 15.24 15 0 40 9.01
1999 12.55 10 0 40 9.13
2000 10.99 10 0 40 8.11Presumably, in the years to come, the growth prospects of the EU and other
major partners would be of vital importance to the growth potential of the coun-
try. The same is true for all the countries in the region. Another peculiarity here
is that Bulgaria enjoys beneficial asymmetric 10-year trade agreements with the
EU, signed in 1993. Other Balkan countries have signed similar, although not
identical, agreements lately and they would presumably face similar challenges.
Bulgaria’s performance might hint at patterns to be avoided or followed.
To demonstrate all these, I need to discuss some peculiarities of the so-called
revealed comparative advantage (RCA). A positive and high value of RCA for a
particular commodity approximates the take off point, which companies may
(or may not) convert into better competitiveness of different commodities on
different markets. The calculation of RCA is according to the conventional for-
mula:
RCA on Bulgaria’s trade: Summary*
Source: Martin Dimitrov and Krassen Stanchev, SEE Trade and Institutions, IME, p. 23, link
The table gives the opportunity for some conclusions, which could be rele-
vant in a regional context.
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j country    to country given a from i commodity of imports of    value    the is -
j country    by country given a    to i commodity of exports of    value    the is -
country given a of    respect in i commodity of ion    product in advantage e comparativ d    reveale is -
)
)
(
(
M
X
RCA
M X
M X
RCA
j
i
j
i
j
i
j
i
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j
i
j
i j
i
+
−
=
EU  CEFTA  SEEC 
95 96 97 98 99 95 96 97 98 99 95 96 97 98 99
SITC 0  + + - + + ++ - - -  - - +++ ++ ++ ++ +++
SITC 1  + ++  ++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ ++ ++ + - -  +
SITC 2  + + ++ + ++ + - - - - - ++ + 0 +
SITC 3  + ++ ++ - + ++ - -  ++ + + +++ +++ ++ ++ +++
SITC 4  - -  - - -  - -  - - -  - - -  - - -  - - -  - - -  - - -  - - -  +++ +++ +++ +++ +++
SITC 5  - - 0 - - -  - - - - - -  +++ ++ ++ ++ ++
SITC 6  + + + + - -- - - -  - -  - -  + ++ ++ ++ +++
SITC 7  - -  - -  - -  - -  - -  - - + + - -  ++ ++ +++ ++ ++
SITC 8  + + + + ++ - - + - -  - -  + +++ +++ +++ +++
*Legend:                                                                 SITC 0 - Food and live animals 
RCA values between 0.7 and 1 (+++)  SITC 1 - Beverages and tobacco 
RCA values between  0.35 and 0.7 (++)  SITC 2 - Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 
RCA values between 0 and 0.35 (+)  SITC 3 - Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 
RCA value 0 (0)  SITC 4 - Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 
RCA values between 0 and -0.35 (-)  SITC 5 - Chemical and related products 
RCA values between -0.35 and -0.7 (- -)  SITC 6 - Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 
RCA values between  -0,7 and -1 (- - -)  SITC 7 - Machinery and transport equipment 
SITC 8 - Miscellaneous manufactured articles The more is the value added, the less is the RCA on EU and CEFTA markets; 
The concentration of RCA is yet more frequent on EU market, presumably
because of the asymmetric agreement still in force; 
The SEE market is a concentration of Bulgaria’s RCAs; it compensates for
lack of position in other directions; 
Bulgaria’s presence on the SEE market is diverse and hardly specialized. It
covers almost evenly the entire SITC classification. Although there is an obvious
interest to maintain this presence, the improved restructuring of other
economies will result in a challenge to improve the competitiveness of Bulgarian
companies trading in the Balkans; 
Recent protectionist and subsidizing policies in Bulgaria
Despite the overall policy towards trade liberalization, lately, the Bulgarian
government aimed to boost economic growth via active measures and interfer-
ence in the economy. In its economic program it announced five priority sectors
- transport, tourism, energy, agriculture and high-tech. Declaring this, the gov-
ernment in fact invited everybody to seek privileges and subsidies. As a result
rent-seeking behavior becomes dominant.
Chronology of subsidies in Bulgaria (last 4-6 months)
In the last several months the government granted a large spectrum of pref-
erences to different producers:
z Decision to purchase 200 000 tones of cereals at fixed price of BGN 160
per tone.
z Protection tariffs for local manufacturers of various vegetables.
z Protection tariffs for local producers of fertilizers.
z Equity swaps in state-owned companies. In April 2002 the government
ordered the State-owned Bulgarian Commercial Fleet to buy the assets
of Varna Shipyard for BGN 35.5 million. What happened in fact was that
the government subsidized the loss-maker through another state com-
pany’s money (part of it borrowed). Other similar deals are: the increase
in capital of the State railways company through a debt-equity swap (the
government in fact exchanged tax arrears of the company for shares in a
company, which is anyway 100% state owned; the amount of the deal is
BGN 127.9 million), the increase in equity of Balkancar with the amount
of BGN 4.2 million.
z Renationalization of the “national” air carrier Balkan that in fact carries
about 1% of the traveling “nation”. Last developments show other gov-
ernment ideas to create a “national carrier” .
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Challenges and risks before see trade liberalizationTopic for discussion. Is the same thing (propensity for active government
interference) happening in other Balkan countries e.g. Yugoslavia?
Who finally pays the bill of subsidizing/protectionist policies?
1. Controls on prices are perhaps the most direct way in which government
distorts price information. In a free market a rising price usually indicates
either rising demand for the product or a decrease in supply. For instance,
over the past 200 years supplies of grain and other farm products are rising
and prices have been falling. Because of this, part of the labor force gradu-
ally re-oriented to other activities. However, that process ended where
governments decided to block the price signals that were telling farmers to
move to more profitable endeavors, subsidizing production. As a result of
subsidizing, less efficient producers keep their position on the market dis-
torting relative prices, which reduces stimulus for all other producers.
Thus resources are diverted from their most valuable use. 
2. In series of cases governments justify subsidizing with the argument of
preserving jobs. In fact, individuals may loose their investments or their
jobs when a competitor comes with more competitive product or service.
This is the typical business risk, which is to be hedged by the very market
participants and not by governments. Otherwise the so-called health
restructuring (creative destruction as formulated by Schumpeter) of the
market is not happening.
5 During the twentieth century many workers
moved from manufacturing to services jobs. On the path of economic
restructuring many people loose their jobs but the result is better standard
of living for everyone. 
3. All kind of subsidies bring either to higher taxes or higher prices paid by
consumers. The basic paradigm of the market economy is that scarce
sources’ use is directed to different sectors by the market participants and
not by any administrative measures. If the government decides which are
the priority sectors we are going back to the central planning. The fact that
more state action leaves less action opportunities for the business seems to
be forgotten. 
4. The division of labor allows people to specialize in what they are best and
to exchange with those who specialize in something else. When particular
producers are subsidized, there are always new coming requests of pres-
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3 For example Patrick Messerlin estimated in "The Costs of Protection in the European Community"
that "the combination of high costs of protection for EC consumers and few jobs saved leads to an
astronomical average annual cost per job saved: roughly Euro 220,000 or 10 times the European
average wage of the sectors in question", p.3sure groups for preferences. Moreover, certain entities re-orient their busi-
ness towards subsidized sectors with the aim to benefit of preferential
treatment. This way as a result of government interference, specialization
depends on administrative discretion and not on market processes.
5.  Generally speaking if you subsidize something you get more of it.
Antipoverty transfers are no exception of this rule. Because of these trans-
fers a lot of people live with the feeling that the government will protect
them in case of economic failure. That is why people are encouraged to
high-risk lifestyle (for example dropping out of school or the workforce,
births by single mothers or even producing goods that lacks demand on
the market). 
6. Subsidies are envisaged to boost development in particular sectors and
therefore to promote the overall economic growth. Administrative regula-
tions pretend to secure sustainable development. However the real mean-
ing of all preferences granted to some groups by the government is re-dis-
tribution of income taken by other groups. So, is it possible to make the
nation wealthier re-distributing income? As taxes to finance the transfer
increase, taxpayers have less incentive to produce and earn and more
incentive to invest in wasteful tax shelters. Similarly, since transfer benefits
tend to decline as the income of the recipient increases, the recipient will
also have less incentive to earn since net income in the most of the cases
would increase by only a small fraction. So, the answer is that those who
are deprived of income have less incentive to produce more, and those
who receive transfers have less incentive to innovate, which means lower
economic activity and lower growth. 
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